

November Seminar

NIDA LACAN STUDY AND READING GROUP

Date: Wednesday 28 November 2018

Time: 6-8 pm

Location: Tutorial Room, No.3, NIDA, 215 Anzac Parade

Reading:

Lacan: *Écrits*

Hegel: *Phenomenology of Spirit*

Kojève: *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*

Badiou: *Conditions*

Badiou: *Infinite thought*

Philosophy with Psychoanalysis: The Hegelian Landscape in Lacan's *Écrits and Seminar VII*

Dr Ehsan Azari Stanizai

Every meaningful relationship we may well imagine between philosophy and psychoanalysis is inexorably tied up to the name of Lacan because he was the first thinker in the history of psychoanalysis that, in a ground-breaking multi-disciplinary setting, integrated philosophical conceptions in psychoanalysis and systematically studied philosophers from pre-Socratics to philosophers of his own generation. Derrida with his close and complex relationship with Lacan himself played a significant role in the development of that trend between philosophy and psychoanalysis during the most productive phase of intellectual debates in France towards the last decades of the 20th century. He was well aware of the force of Lacan's thinking in this respect, as he remarked, "Lacan's refinement and competence, his philosophical originality, have no precedent in the tradition or psychoanalysis," (Derrida, 1996, 46). Freud was sceptical about philosophy, though it is common perception among Freudian scholars that he was interested in reading Aristotle, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. His wariness arose from the very fact that his cherished discovery, the unconscious was largely denied in Western metaphysics. In the meantime, he was aware of the threat to the plausibility of his theories and the non-reception of some of his ideas that their grounding was in contrast to the traditional philosophical reasoning and rationality, as he pronounced in his *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, "We have nothing to expect from philosophy except that it will once again haughtily point out to us the intellectual inferiority of the object of our study," (Freud, 1991, 127). Lacan revolutionized this paradigm. Despite his ambivalence about philosophy, Lacan's considerably implanted his theory in philosophical discourse. It is hard to find a single page in his text where he hasn't made open or latent references to philosophers and their works. His early works at least to the time of the publication of his *magnum opus*, *Écrits* in 1966 are dense with direct and indirect references and allusions to philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and others. However, Hegel and especially his *Phenomenology of Spirit* occupies a dominant place in his early seminars and writings. In

late Lacan, on the other hand, we can find scattered references to pre-Socratics, especially, Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. With the pre-Socratics, Lacan was fascinated with their emphasis on, “binding love to the question of the truth,” (Badiou, 2006, 10).

It is rather fashionable these days to “go beyond” the classical philosophers. I could just as easily have started with the admirable dialogue in the Parmenides. For neither Socrates nor Descartes, nor Marx, nor Freud, can be “gone beyond,” in so far as they carried out their research with the passion to unveil that has an object: truth. (Lacan, 2007, 156)

Like many other theorists in the French tradition, Lacan’s critical thinking swerves away from the hegemonic tradition of metaphysics which was concerned largely with the ‘lure’ of reason as an insurance policy to reach to the final truth. In his late teaching, for example Lacan emphasized that love “brings being face to face with itself...this is expressed in Empedocles description of love as the ‘power of cohesion and harmony’” (Badiou, 2006, 10). This is what mystics who were by no means strangers to Lacan’s thinking would condition the understanding of the truth and God by means of love. In general, Lacan’s engagement with (pre/post)- Socratic philosophy had three main objectives.

1. The use of philosophy as support for his conceptual universe and providing logical ingredients for his very theorization. This is done from a psychoanalytic perspective in a way that Lacan would never allow himself to fall wholly into any specific philosophical system.
2. Elucidate, analyse, and interpret the works of philosophers.
3. Provide in-depth critique of the various philosophical systems.

In this essay, I will first try to introduce the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis by making an inquiry into Badiou’s writings on this issue. From there, I will proceed to the place of Hegel in Lacan’s early works, especially his two texts: *Écrits* and *The Ethic of Psychoanalysis*. By doing so, I will offer a broader illustration of Lacan’s analysis of Hegel’s thinking and the syncretization of his theories with Hegel’s concepts.

In looking at Badiou’s writings on the critical-productive relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis, we may well underscore four major ideas.

1. Psychoanalysis and contemporary philosophy in particular, perceives psychoanalysis as a kind of *thinking* which, as science, physics, and politics bear evidence, lives and subsists as a combination of a theory and practice.
2. The crucial issue that both philosophy and psychoanalysis are interested to deal with is the idea of the truth and its connexion with the real. The real separated from thinking is an absence identified as a void or a hole in psychoanalysis. For Lacan the truth must be found in the Other that doesn’t exist, in term of a hole in knowledge. The Other which is the locus of the speech and signifiers as well. This is a locus of the truth which lacks “a signifier that could be the guarantor of such truth,” (Marini, 1992, 169). Also, in psychoanalysis the void is located in the subject that occupies the gaps between signifiers in the signifying chain, but philosophy as Badiou emphasizes, confines this void in *being*. “It is on this basis that Lacan undertook the critique of philosophy or what he calls antiphilosophy,” (Badiou, 2007, 66).

3. Contemporary Philosophy joins psychoanalysis in locating the void, the unknowable truth, within the mathematical formalization. This is because mathematics as Badiou concludes “knots *letters* and the *real* together,” (Ibid, 67). To clarify this by an example, consider Lacan’s mathéme of fantasy $\$ \langle \rangle a$, which means that the barred subject is bigger or greater than the object-cause of desire a . The real by this formula is learned beyond consciousness, where “we grasp the real as an impasse of formalization,” (Lee, 1990, 193). This is the reason why Lacan idealizes mathematical formalization, for, as Badiou spells out, “mathematics is precisely the thinking which has nothing to do with the experience of consciousness,” (Badiou, 2007, 67). Thus, the barred subject $\$$, object a and the insignia $\langle \rangle$ allow transmitting the void or truth as something accepted in the mind in terms of abstract mathematical letters. Such mathematical letters are compatible with the un-symbolizable *real*. Mathematics allows to identify idea alone in abstraction, as Badiou goes on to add, “Mathematics has always been the place-holder of the Idea as Idea to which Lacan gave the name of mathéme,” (Badiou, 2008, 207). Thus, the ideas related to void in the subject and in being pull together the focus of contemporary philosophy and psychoanalysis. What does this void or hole mean? The void primarily means that the truth is inaccessible and unknowable fully and always remains interwoven with error, “The point that psychoanalysis and philosophy have in common is that they both hold truth and error to be absolutely entwined,” (Badiou, 2008, 205). Therefore, the only place that is able to accommodate the idea of the truth is mathematics or to be more precise the mathéme. In other words, as Badiou says, mathematics “holds together the Idea and the thing,” (ibid, 209).

Mathematics is precisely the thinking which has nothing to do with the experiences of consciousness; it is the thinking which has no relation to reality, but which knots letters to the real together, a thinking faced with the void because it obeys the ideal of formalization. (Badiou, 2007, 67)

4. Lacan is an ‘anti-philosopher’ because philosophy for him was part of the discourse of the master where the presence of the subject is illusively assumed as autonomous and its primary split is denied. It is the opposite of the discourse of the analyst, $a/S2 \rightarrow \$/S1$, where the dominant position is occupied by the object a that functions as the object of desire for the analysand. Lacan doesn’t accept any dominant or master role for the analyst during the treatment. In this context, the discourses of the analyst or psychoanalysis as a whole, reverse the discourses of the master or philosophy. Thus, in the discourse of the master $S1/\$ \rightarrow S2/a$, functions as a cover for the division of the subject. This calls into question the totalizing effect of any philosophical system. In philosophy, the desire of the philosopher is always denied. However, Lacan’s anti-philosophy is partly embodied by his own harsh treatment of philosophy. He uses routinely philosophy with enthusiasm and then tosses away the legitimate grounding of the philosophical conceptions. This is greatly similar to what Derrida is doing in his dealing with psychoanalysis.

Lacan vigorously extends philosophy, especially Hegel into the field of psychoanalytic theory in his *Éthics*. The publication of this book sparked assumptions by French thinkers about Lacan's absorption in Hegel. For instance, Élisabeth Roudinesco identifies *Écrits* as, "a summa that resembles both Saussure's Course in General Linguistics and Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit." Roudinesco, 2014, 99). Badiou goes further by calling him "our Hegel," (Badiou, 2014, 22). However, Lacan remains fiercely defiant. In *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, in response to his critics who blamed him for being too Hegelian, Lacan distances himself from Hegel and criticizes his radicalism. Lacan concedes that it was for him necessary to walk on the Hegelian path "to create a breach in the so-called world of positivity," (Lacan, 2013, 61). When a participant asked him during a session of *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, "'You are the son of Hegel,' Lacan's answered, 'I don't agree'. Then his son-in-law, J A Miller came up and added, what about 'Lacan against Hegel?'. 'You are much closer to the truth,'" Lacan retorted. (Lacan, 1994, 2015)

Lacan is unwilling to stop at that. He expounds that the whole purpose of the Hegelian dialectic was filling a gap in philosophy and that was "an intrinsic deficiency of a predictive logic," (Lacan, 2013, 61). Lacan gives the example of the particularization of the universal by means of *Aufhebung*, which for Lacan was nothing but a 'sweet dream' of Western metaphysics.

Hegel's entire dialectic is designed to fill this gap and to show, through a prestigious transmutation, how the universal can manage to be particularized through the path of scansion brought on by *Aufhebung* [sublation]. (Ibid)

Likewise, in *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan declares that his dialectic of desire is far distinct from that of Hegel's. He compares Hegel's theory of desire with that of his own. He posits desire as a desire which exists for another desire. In Lacanian theoretical parlance, desire needs to be desired and this makes desire always unsatisfied and trapped in an endless metonymic route. Furthermore, Lacan argues that the weakest point in Hegel is his troubles with 'poetics'. This weakness, according to Lacan, unveils itself in Hegel's criticism of *Antigone* to which he is drawn mainly because the play represents for him an instance of the historical dialectic. For Hegel, *Antigone* was a playground for the contradiction in the discourses, the discourse of the state (its agent is Creon) and the discourse of the family (Antigone is its agent). As the end of the Sophoclean drama reveals, the dialectical reconciliation doesn't happen. In other words, it contradicts unequivocally *Aufhebung*.

For the long time in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Hegel tried to articulate the problem of human history in terms of conflicts between discourses. The tragedy of *Antigone* especially appealed to him because he saw the clear opposition there between the discourse of the family and that of the state. (Lacan, 1992, 235-236)

Hence, the conflict in the play leads to its logical ending not a dialectical recuperative solution that Hegel envisions. The *Antigone* was called 'perfect tragedy' by Hegel, for the play, as it was stated, revealed for Hegel the fight between two self-consciousnesses or two desires. For Lacan *Antigone* reveals pure desire because pure desire is always for death. Lacan is interested instead in *Antigone's* intrinsic passion, which for him was a manifestation of the death drive.

Lacan draws upon literature in the same way that he engages with philosophy. In analysing literary discourses, he seeks experimenting and illustration of his own theories. In Seminar

VI: *Le désir et son interprétation* (1958-1959), for example, he is exultantly vacillating between Hegel's *Phenomenology* and Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. Hamlet as a character, and his engagement in the events, provides him a model for a desiring subject that doesn't know how to desire. This makes the drama as the drama of the tragedy of desire. The enigma that Hamlet posed for literary critics from Johnson to Goethe and T S Eliot was the enigma of his disability to undertake the necessary act and his procrastination. In classical literary criticism, the answer for this enigma, as Goethe and Eliot suggested, was Shakespeare's inability to create a strong and decisive character, which was defined by Aristotle's *Poetics*. Lacan overturned this traditional view in Shakespeare's scholarship by calling Hamlet an exemplary modern character who walked beyond Aristotelian limitations on the boundary of a dramatic hero. Failing to desire is caused by Hamlet's compulsive unconscious attachment to his father's killer, Claudius and his own disloyal mother. Shakespeare's maxim of 'to be or not to be' unfolds the anxiety that befalls the destiny of Hamlet's desire. The desire is essentially a desire for being—want to be. This phrase exposes Hamlet as a depressive character caught up between two impulses, namely to stay in desire or eliminate himself and everything.

Nevertheless, Hegel comes to the attention of Lacan when Alexandre Kojève gave a series of lectures on Hegel from 1933 to 1939 in Sorbonne. "Myself, for example, I might easily have never encountered Kojève. If I have never encountered him, it is highly likely that, like all French people educated over a certain period, I would never have suspected that there was anything in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*," (Lacan, 2006, 173). This was clearly Kojève who made Hegel for Lacan "the most philosophical of all philosophers," Badiou, 2017, 56).

To comprehend Lacan's deployment of Hegel, one must consider the conception of the dialectic and Hegel's fable of master/slave that directly and indirectly occupies Lacan's *Écrits*. The parable differentiates 'natural individual' from 'human individual'. It validates desire insofar as it is human and is the desire for the other's desire. The satisfaction of desire is possible only when it is mediated by the desire of the other in the *Phenomenology*. In the same way, one's self-consciousness is achieved and confirmed by another self-consciousness, to a degree that "the relation of two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle," (Hegel, 1977, 113-114). It is important to note that Lacan unequivocally develops his own theory of desire on the basis of Kojève's lectures and Freud with the mediation of Saussure's structuralist linguistics. Desire exposes a lack, which is essentially the intrinsic impulses for desiring. The lack is also the driving force that keeps desire afloat. This mechanism exists as long as desire of the self is recognized by another self, as in the dialectic of Hegel's master and slave.

With this connection as it was suggested above, Hegel divides desire into biological or animal desire and human or anthropogenetic desire. The animal desire has to be directed to a real object in the world and it has to be satisfied, but human desire is always directed to an emptiness, the other's desire. If every human desire is directed towards an object that doesn't exist in the real world, it has to be mediated by the other's desire. This object functions as the object that causes and runs desire, as Kojève writes, "For man to be truly human, for him to be essentially and really different from an animal, his human Desire must actually win out over his animal Desire," (Kojève, 1977, 6). In Lacan's reading of Hegel, this logic gives great support for his own theory of desire, as desire for him remained irreducible to the linguistic demand and the biological need. On the contrary, desire is the surplus that arises from the subtraction of the need from the demand. That surplus is thus the love that is associated with the need in the discourse of the demand. Therefore, desire is for something

unknowable that always remains inarticulable, as Lacan says, “to put it elliptically, it is precisely because desire is articulated that is not articulable—by which I mean in the discourse that suits it, an ethical, not psychological discourse.” (Lacan, 2007, 681)

In Hegel’s thinking, the self-consciousness, which is another name for desire, implies a departure from nature (animal desire) and arrival to culture (human desire). Lacan points out that self-consciousness in Hegel takes its roots in the Cartesian prominence of the consciousness. For Hegel, the absolute knowledge is the final rational evolutionary stage that refers to the integration of truth through reason. Reason allows progress to be perfected. For Lacan this progressive understanding of self-consciousness and absolute knowledge is merely an illusion. This perfection for Lacan is part of the conceit by the ego which remains in an imaginary deadlock of mastery. Furthermore, the dialectical evolution of the consciousness for Lacan was a misrecognition, “the only homogenous function of consciousness is found in the ego’s imaginary capture by its specular reflection, and in the function of misrecognition that remains tied to it,” (Lacan, 2006, 705). In the meantime, this is an idealized evolutionary stage in human consciousness when being and truth come into a unity. Hegel saw this ideal first and foremost in himself as being a philosopher. The ideal progress of Hegel’s *Aufhebung* for Lacan was nothing but “the avatars of a lack.” (Ibid, 710).

For further comprehension of Hegel’s insight on the importance of consciousness in relation to another consciousness, we can see the grounding of Lacan’s theory of intersubjectivity. For example, when I am caught up in a conversation with another person—another I, my consciousness is open to my interlocuter as it is open to myself, even perhaps more open than myself. Jean Hyppolite for whom Hegel was for the contemporary philosophy as Aristotle was for the medieval philosophy, underlines the significance of this dialectic between two consciousnesses, “Ordinary consciousness, which Hegel investigates in the *Phenomenology*, doesn’t always know what it is saying nor who is speaking through it; another consciousness sometimes understands it better than it understands itself as the psychiatric dialogue confirms, (Hyppolite, 1982, 162). As such, for Hyppolite, the mind makes its presence in every exercise of language. Hegel examines the exchange between two self-consciousnesses where one self-consciousness understands his own self-consciousness by looking in the other. By the same token, this exchange also reveals the existence of desire. In the exchange of two self-consciousness, the desire for prestige and recognition comes into play on both sides. Each desire or self-consciousness seeks recognition and precisely satisfaction from the other.

Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come *out of itself*. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self. (Hegel, 1977, 111).

To give a simple example, the same happens in a love bond. When one says ‘I love you’ this statement by itself is not an issue until it is reciprocated and recognized by the other. That is why a lover would always eagerly be waiting to hear from the one he/she loves a clear answer to this question: ‘if you love me let me know’. One’s love is love only when it is recognized and reciprocated by the other. Love is of course not desire.

For Hegel, the self-consciousness requires human desire to be directed for non-being or another desire. Lacan insists that self-consciousness is the recognition in the mirror of the reflected image as the foundation of the constitution of the ego. This self-identification arises from a sense of compensation for the alienated and fragmented body of the subject. In the

mirror stage a child not only constitutes his *I* or identity by an internalization of an image from the outside. Besides, this ideal (idealized) image (specular image) [in Lacan algebra it is written in the graph of desire as $i(a)$], is the subject's rival too. This process generates aggressiveness in the subject, which is often directed towards that rival. On the other hand, the identity of the subject is threatened by the internalized image of the other from outside. Lacan is fascinated by the logic of aggressiveness that Hegel revealed in the *Phenomenology*. He hails Hegel for his theorization of the aggressiveness before Darwin:

Before Darwin, however, Hegel had provided the definitive theory of the specific function of aggressiveness in human ontology, seeming to prophesy the iron law of our own time. From the conflict between Master and Slave, he deduced the entire subjective and objective progress of our history, revealing in its crises the syntheses represented by the highest forms of the status of the person in the West, from the Stoic to the Christian, and even to the future citizen of the Universal State. (Lacan, 2007, 89)

In the dialectic of the master and slave, Lacan also realized another Hegelian insight that can be also seen in the behaviour of an obsessive. An obsessive is always plagued by procrastination and doubt. The slave knows that the master also dies and therefore he/she is inclined to be succumbed to the mastery of the master. Hence, the slave will do everything to please the master.

Ceasing upon Hegel's triad, *universal-particular-individual*, especially the difference between the universal and particular, Lacan sees Hegel's unique contribution to philosophy. In Hegel, Particular is a specification of the universal which is the general terms for the essence of the thing, for instance colour is universal but the colour green or red is particular. Lacan extends this acumen into psychoanalysis in terms of the division of the subject and a rejection of the autonomy and totality of the individual ego.

But if there is still something prophetic in Hegel's insistence on the fundamental identity of the particular and the universal, an insistence that reveals the extent of his genius, it is certainly psychoanalysis that provides it with its paradigm by revealing the structure in which this identity is realized as disjunctive of the subject. (Lacan, 2007, 242)

As already indicated above, self-consciousness for Hegel was self-differentiating, and it is not "the pure abstraction of the 'I', but an 'I' which has the otherness within itself," (Hegel, 1977, 121). Hegel spells out that self-consciousness exists to face another self-consciousness and it needs to alienate and exit from itself. This idea has two consequences, firstly, it loses itself and find itself in the other; secondly, the other is not seen as other but as a reflection of the oneself. The self-consciousness is connected with desire when it is a desire for something beyond everyday reality. That beyond is in fact desire itself, "For Desire taken as Desire—i.e., before its satisfaction—is but a revealed nothingness, as unreal emptiness." (Kojève, 1969, 5). Lacan justifies his own theory of the ego and its imperishable alienation by Hegel's theory of the constitution of the self-consciousness. For the ego is perpetually ensnared in the imaginary. It is based on an illusion of autonomy. Therefore, we have to "understand the ego entirely in the movement of progressive alienation in which self-consciousness is constituted in Hegel's phenomenology," (Lacan, 2007, 312).

Moreover, Hegel demonstrates in the *Phenomenology* the dialectic of self-consciousness in terms of the ‘beautiful soul’ and the ‘law of the heart’. In this stage of self-consciousness, the subject projects its own internal disorder on the whole world and finds a solution and cure for this disorder by what he has developed as the ‘law of the heart’. To clarify this paradoxical notion in Hegel’s philosophy, it is important to examine this so called ‘beautiful soul’ briefly in his own text. Under a subtitle “Conscience. The beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness,” in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel posits the dual nature of human conscience vis-à-vis the overall social morality. Two consciousnesses arise from the conscience. One consciousness is moral and the other non-moral, which are in a perpetual conflict with each other and in their approach to the outside world. The ‘beautiful soul’ wants to keep the universal pure by bringing it under the command of his own self-consciousness. The ‘beautiful soul’ is always in an irreconcilable struggle with the universal morality, which is never able to accept the universal morality in the society. The ‘beautiful soul’ indicates a conscience, which is self-centred and individualistic. The person is isolated from all and turns into a compulsive worshipper of his own inner laws. Hegel borrows the idea of the ‘beautiful soul’ from German romanticism, particularly from “Rousseau, Shiller and Goethe,” (Houlgate, 2005, 90). The other consciousness that arise from the conscience accept the world and go about to swear allegiance to the public and universal morality.

The ‘beautiful souls’, lacking an actual existence, entangled in the contradiction between its pure self and the necessity of the self to externalize itself and change itself into an *actual* existence, and swelling in the *immediacy* of this firmly held antithesis—an immediacy which alone is the middle term reconciling the antithesis, which has been intensified to its pure abstraction...this ‘beautiful soul’, then, being conscious of this contradiction in its unreconciled immediacy, is disordered to the point of madness. (Hegel, 1977, 406-407)

Lacan illustrates Hegel’s insight of the ‘beautiful soul’ by elaborating on Molière’s comedy, *The Misanthrope*, where the hero, Alceste is obsessed with the denial of his own internal crisis by waging a war against the world in order to project his own crisis on everyone else. Hegel’s “dialectic of the beautiful soul and the law of the heart,” as Lacan says, remains, “caught in the trap offered by the mirage of consciousness to the *I* infatuated with its own feeling, which Hegel turns into the law of the heart,” (Lacan, 2006, 345). Alceste imposes his own ‘law of the heart’ on everyone in every individual is hateful to the core.

In short, Lacan deciphers the law of the beautiful soul, nothing but the law of the modern ego that denies its own part in the disorder of the world. He unveils this in the constitution of the identification of the ego and the *I* in the mirror stage and the imaginary order as a whole which, is plagued with misrecognition, aggressiveness, and narcissistic impulses of love and hate. In Lacan clinic, paranoia for instance manifests the paranoiac misunderstanding in the identification of the ego and neurosis denies the responsibility. Even Hegel himself, according to Lacan, isn’t immune to fall in these categories in the *Phenomenology*. To this end, Lacan traces in the early chapters of the *Phenomenology* condemnation of human kind and its follies. The beautiful soul is in fact Hegel’s own that is transmuted as the law of his heart. As such, “Hegel, who exposes identification in their illusoriness”, is himself subject to the temptation he denounces,” (Bowie, 1991, 98). Bowie also claim correctly that Hegel was well aware of the emptiness within the symbolic and that is the reason of why he was decoyed into a “fraudulent intactness of the Imaginary,” (Ibid). The unhappy consciousness of man is a product of inward looking at the divided self and then projecting it on the outside world. For this, Hegel is seeking a solution through reason and knowledge.

In conclusion, Lacan has established between philosophy and psychoanalysis an enduring relationship that was long overdue, even though Freud consistently read philosophy before him. For Freud, psychoanalysis arrived in order to fill the gap that was left out by other disciplines including the philosophical genre. In *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, in good faith, he claims that, “Neither speculative philosophy, nor descriptive psychology, nor what is called experimental (which is closely allied to the physiology of the sense-organs), as they taught in the universities, are in a position to tell you anything serviceable of the relation between body and mind or to provide you with the key to the understanding of possible disturbances of the mental functions,” (Freud, 1991, 45). By contrast, Lacan reframed psychoanalytic argumentative structure by bringing the psychoanalysis and philosophy together for a perpetual dialogue. Lacan’s close ties with Hegel saved psychoanalysis from being an isolated discipline and elevated it to the multidisciplinary intellectual mainstream. He forged a pathway for integrating philosophy into psychoanalytic discourse and vice versa. Lacan hinted somewhere that philosophy is showing signs of aging, but by blending these disciplines, Lacan also teaches the ways for the nurturing and rejuvenation of philosophy. This assignment was taken up by Badiou whose works demonstrate the cross-fertilization between the two disciplines. Derrida also took Lacan’s lead in developing his own deconstruction, by using and critically engaging with psychoanalysis while distancing himself from it at the same time. Lacan did the same with philosophy. By building the relationship between literature and psychoanalysis, Lacan also helped integrate literature into philosophy. His theory of desire pioneers in the history of literary studies, a glamorous multidisciplinary interaction between literature, psychoanalysis, and philosophy. Accordingly, Lacan’s deployment of philosophy has enhanced the critical and interpretive power of literary studies as well. Lacan’s passionate engagement with philosophy doesn’t prevent him to unveil the hidden truths in literature and voids in the philosophical discourse. He warns against the master discourse to which philosophy is linked, which for him, leads to a utopian strategy of thinking. To this end, he exposes the inconsistencies of Hegel’s structure of dialectical thinking. The progressive nature of the dialectical development of the consciousness to the ‘absolute knowledge’ was criticized by Lacan as a mere attempt to recuperate the undrivable and inconceivable lack. Hegel’s solution of *Aufhebung* was a dream in philosophy that remained for Hegel to reveal. For Lacan, this recuperative solution was utopian, for this denies the final synthesis in Hegel’s enterprise of dialectic. In attempting this, the utopian dream in philosophy reached its climax when Marx placed the dialectical solution at the heart of social progress. By the same token, Hegel’s dialectical evolution of the subject and desire is influential in Lacan’s theory of the subject and desire. Both the subject and desire in Lacan’s theory is fundamentally distinctive. Lacan’s theory doesn’t accept the cooperative and reconcilable feature of Hegel’s dialectic.

Note:

Badiou, Alain, (2006), “Lacan and the Pre-Socratics,” *Lacan: The Silent Partners*, edit. Slavoj Žižek, Verso, London.

———(2007a), *Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy*, trans. and edit. Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens, Continuum, London.

———(2008), *Condition*, trans. Steven Corcoran, Continuum, London.

Badiou and Roudinesco, (2014), *Lacan: Past and Present—a Dialogue*, trans. Jason E Smith, Columbia University Press, New York

- Badiou and Barbara Cassin, (2017), *There's no Such Thing as a Sexual Relationship: Two Lessons on Lacan*, trans. Susan Spitzer & Kenneth Reinhard, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Bowie, Malcolm, (1991), *Lacan*, Fontana Modern Masters, Fontana Press, An Imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, London.
- Derrida, Jacques, (1996), *Resistances of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Peggy Kamuf, et al. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
- Freud, Sigmund, (1991), *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (I)*, trans. and edit. James Strachey, Penguin Books, London.
- Hegel, G W F, (1977), *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A V Miller with Analysis of the Text and Forward by J N Findlay, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Houlgate, Stephen, (2005), *An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History*, second edition, Blackwell Publishing, MA)
- Hyppolite, Jean, (1982), "The Structure of Philosophic Language According to the "Preface," to Hegel's phenomenology of the Mind," *The Structuralist Controversy: The Language of Criticism and the Science of Man*, edit. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Kakève, Alexandre, (1969), *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirits*, assembled by Raymond Queneau. trans. James H Nichols, Jr, edit. Allan Bloom, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York.
- Lacan, Jacques, (1992), *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960*, trans. Denis Porter, edit. Jacques-Alain Miller, Routledge, London.
- (1994), *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Penguin Books, London.
- (2006), *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink in collaboration with Héloïse Fink and Russell Grigg, Bruce Fink, WW Norton & Company, New York.
- (2007), *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Russell Grigg, edit. Jacques-Alain Miller, WW Norton & Company, New York.
- (2013), *On the Names-of-the Father*, trans. Bruce Fink, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Lee, Jonathan Scott, (1990), *Jacques Lacan*, The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst.
- Marini, Marcelle, (1992), *Jacques Lacan: The French Context*, trans. Anne Tomiche, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick.
- Roudinesco, Élisabeth, (2014), *Lacan: in Spite of Everything*, trans. Gregory Elliott, Verso, London.
- Samuels, Robert, (1993), *Between Philosophy & Psychoanalysis: Lacan's Reconstruction of Freud*, Routledge, London.